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David Orentlicher, Two Presidents Are
Better Than One: The Case for a
Bipartisan Executive Branch
Jeff Smith
1 In  recent  years,  American  politics  has  fallen  into  what
amounts to an ongoing, low-grade constitutional crisis. This
condition still goes by time-honored names like “gridlock,”
“polarization”  and  “brinksmanship,”  but  as  it  has  grown
more  serious,  other  terms  have  come  into  vogue:
“radicalization,”  “dysfunction,”  “constitutional  hardball,”
“total  obstruction,”  “hostage-taking,”  a  “toxic”  or
“scorched-earth”  politics,  the  “death  of  comity,”  the
destruction  of  “political  norms,”  the  “weaponizing”  of
parliamentary  rules.  Presidential actions  that  used  to  be
largely routine,  like the appointing of  judges and agency
heads,  are  now  instead  routinely  politicized  or  blocked
altogether.  The  filibuster,  a  once-rare  maneuver  to  stop
action in the U.S. Senate by requiring supermajority votes,
has  become  standard  operating  procedure,  with  only  a
minimal (and partisan) recent revision to at least allow the
staffing of agencies and courts. Threats to shut down the
government or cut off America’s borrowing authority, thus
risking global financial turmoil, have become almost once-a-
year instead of once-a-generation events. Party-line voting
is common, indeed the norm on major legislation – of which
there rarely is any, since the problems just listed make it
almost impossible to pass.
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2   Addressing  those  problems  may  well  call  for  drastic
reforms, and this book proposes one. The proposal seems to
have few takers; Two Presidents Are Better Than One has
been  out  since  2013,  with  little  sign  of  any  movement
developing  to  advance  its  ideas.  The  book  nonetheless
makes for a very interesting thought experiment, perhaps
all the more so insofar as its analysis is crucially mistaken.
3
As  a  law  professor  and  constitutional  law  scholar,
medical  doctor,  health-care  expert,  and  former  Indiana
Democratic state legislator, author David Orentlicher comes
well  prepared.  What  he  calls  for,  simply,  is  a  “plural
executive”: a two-person presidency, with one co-president
chosen from each of America’s two leading parties. Large
parts of his short book are devoted to demonstrating that
such an idea is not as strange as it sounds, and of course to
detailing  what  he  sees  as  its  advantages.  By  removing
executive power and the nation’s focus from one individual,
Orentlicher argues, a bipartisan presidency would be less
“imperial” (a longstanding criticism), and less likely to be
viewed unrealistically as a national “savior.” It would give
both parties a stake in the executive’s success, eliminating
the  incentive  for  total  obstruction,  lowering  the  level  of
partisan discord,  smoothing relations  with  Congress,  and
better representing the views of citizens across the political
spectrum,  which  in  turn  would  raise  public  interest  and
participation in politics. Sharing decision-making between
co-presidents would reduce the chance of costly mistakes,
and  would  ensure  that  major  initiatives  had  bipartisan
legitimacy and backing.  And far  from departing radically
from America’s constitutional design, Orentlicher says,
it would be more faithful than a single president to the framers’ overall vision of
the  national  government.  The  framers  did  not  anticipate  the  emergence  of  a
powerful,  policy-making  president,  nor  did  they  foresee  its  impact  on  the
constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches. They did not
predict the enormous role of political parties and their distortion of the political
process. A two-person presidency can do much to address these problems so the
national government better realizes the founding fathers’ vision. (17)
4 As  Orentlicher  points  out,  the  1787  Constitutional
Convention considered creating a  plural  executive,  albeit
based not on parties but on regions. Other precedents he
cites  for  divided  executive  power  include  the  governing
structures of business corporations; American states, many
of  which  elect  several  of  their  top  executives;  semi-
freestanding  executive  agencies,  like  the  U.S.  Federal
Reserve  Board,  that  make  policy  to  varying  degrees
independently  of  the  presidents  who  appoint  them;
parliamentary Cabinet governments, with their traditions of
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ministerial  responsibility;  “cohabitation” arrangements
between  opposing  presidents  and  prime  ministers  in
France; and, somewhat further afield, the “dual monarchy”
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Perhaps the closest
analogue  to  Orentlicher’s  proposal  is  a  “national  unity”
government of the kind that several nations have convened
during wars or other great crises, with opposition leaders
purposely included in Cabinets to ensure that decisions on
which the nation’s survival might depend have the broadest
possible public support.
5
There  are  obvious  objections  to  his  scheme  that
Orentlicher does an impressive job trying to answer, with
frequent  and  informative  reference  not  just  to  historical
cases  but  to  current  political  science,  game  theory,  and
pyschological  research  on  decision-making  and  related
problems  like  “groupthink.”  He  admits  that  many  of  his
answers are educated guesses. Wouldn’t guaranteeing that
both  parties  “win”  turn  presidential  elections  into  non-
events?  Yes,  but  it  could  also  increase  interest  in
nomination  contests  and  perhaps  encourage  the  rise  of
viable  third  parties.  What  about  foreign  policy?  A  dual
executive would deal with other nations more moderately
and, by plausibly representing America as a whole,  more
effectively. What about piloting the idea at the state level
first? Yes, Orentlicher agrees, that might be a good idea.
And so on. It is a thoughtful discussion, and much of the
book’s value comes from the chance to follow along with
Orentlicher as he thinks the idea through.
6
There  is  something  odd,  though,  about  the  whole
premise.  In  the United States,  even commonsensical  and
much-discussed systemtic reforms – like electing presidents
directly,  or  regulating  the  legalized  bribery  known  as
campaign finance – struggle mightily to make headway. A
transformation as large as Orentlicher’s would be thinkable
only  in  a  system  that  was  relatively  fluid  and  open  to
change. But if America had such a system, the deadlocks
and dysfunctions that seem to call for big change probably
would  not  exist  in  the  first  place.  In  that  sense,  this
proposal is self-canceling.
7
But  to  consider  it  on  its  merits:  Why wouldn’t two
presidents be better than one? Orentlicher is right, after all,
that  America’s  constitutional  design  is  not  currently
working  as  the  framers  would  have  wished.  What  he  is
missing,  though,  are  the  all-important  concepts  of  “veto
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points”  and  “status-quo  bias.”  Put  simply,  the  American
system has too many veto points, too many ways in which
action can be blocked.  It  is  therefore too difficult  to  get
things done, and the result for policy is a strong structural
bias  in  favor  of  current  arrangements  and  opposed  to
reforms  of  any  kind.  The  principal  problem  with  a  dual
executive  is  that  it  would  create  yet  another  veto  point,
another and very large obstacle to  getting policies  made
even when they would benefit the country. 
8
To take an instructive case that Orentlicher himself
discusses: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA), popularly known as “Obamacare,” was a relatively
modest reform, aimed at a goal that the Democratic Party
had  sought  for  decades  –  universal  access  to  affordable
health  care,  like  that  which  the  citizens  of  every  other
advanced country have long taken for granted. It was not a
nationalization  of  health  care  itself  on the  model  of  the
British National Health Service, nor even a nationalization
of health insurance on the model of Canada’s Medicare (or
America’s own Medicare, which however is limited to senior
citizens).  It  was  a  federal  reorganization  of  insurance
markets, combined with a system of regulations, mandates
and  subsidies  designed  to  deliver  private  insurance
companies millions of new customers on condition that they
not discriminate against the sick. It was not fully in effect
yet when Orentlicher wrote his book, but it is now, and by
most measures it’s working better and at lower cost than
expected: uninsurance rates have plummeted, and health-
cost inflation has noticeably slowed.
9
But  the  ACA  has  nearly  been  stopped  or  gutted
numerous  times.  It  exists  only  because  of  a  short-lived,
filibuster-proof  Democratic  supermajority  in  Congress,
some fancy parliamentary footwork after that majority was
unexpectedly  lost,  continued  Democratic  control  of  the
presidency after 2012, and a single vote on an otherwise
hostile  Supreme  Court,  which  has  twice  been  asked  to
destroy or seriously weaken the act – both times on dubious
and once on ridiculous grounds (a single ambiguous phrase)
– and which did damage it by allowing states to partly opt
out,  leaving  millions  of  poorer  Americans  in  Republican-
controlled states still uninsured at this late date. At every
stage,  Republican  opposition  has  been  near-total  and  at
times  hysterical,  and  each  veto  point  has  given  that
opposition  new  opportunities.  The  ACA  has,  just  barely,
made it past them all mostly intact, but this makes it the
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exception  that  proves  the  rule:  No  other  such  new
programs  are  even  under  serious  consideration,  and  the
next  opportunity  for  one  will  probably  not  arise  until
sometime in the 2020s.
10
Under  Orentlicher’s  proposal,  co-presidents  would
have to agree in order to do anything. That means that each
would be a veto point for the other. In perhaps the least
persuasive  passage  in  the  book,  Orentlicher  argues  that
such a system would have led to more, not less, health-care
reform:  a  Barack  Obama  -  John  McCain  co-presidency
“probably would have proposed a bill at least as significant
as what eventually passed” (161).  The weaknesses of the
ACA,  he  believes,  are  the  result  of  party  competition
creating incentives for each side to undermine the other’s
initiatives.  Co-presidents  would  share  an  “interest  in
making change and creating a legacy for the ages, and their
proposals  would  not  automatically  provoke  partisan
opposition. The effect of a second president easily could be
not to stifle policy initiatives but to channel them in a more
balanced  direction.”  Since  an  Obama-McCain
administration would have had bipartisan support, it would
have faced fewer effective veto points, not more. Instead of
having to thread a needle, as Obama did, it could have been
bold, “push[ing] for a real overhaul of the U.S. health care
system” (160).
11
This, to put it mildly, is a very best-case scenario. It
presumes that both parties broadly agree that the federal
government  should  use  its  power  to  solve  problems  like
lack of access to health care, even if that means legislating
nationally,  raising  some  taxes,  intervening  in  the  “free
market” (as conservatives like to call it), and overriding the
wishes  of  some  states.  Behind  this  are  the  further
assumptions  that  markets  might  fail  at  furnishing  what
modern societies need, that central governments are proper
vehicles  for  correcting this,  that  Americans’  rights  ought
not depend on where they live, and that people should not
be faulted for  lacking basic  necessities,  which should  be
treated as entitlements of citizenship rather than rewards
for  “success.”  In  fact,  though,  these  are  precisely  the
philosophical differences between the parties. “In the end,”
Orentlicher  writes,  “voters  want  their  elected  officials  to
solve  problems,  not  to  let  the  country’s  problems  go
unaddressed” (128). True, and if both parties thought like
Democrats,  ambitious  problem-solving  would  be  possible
even  without  a  co-presidency.  As  it  is,  problems  go
unaddressed because Americans don’t even agree on what
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count  as  problems.  Republicans  –  the  party  to  which
Orentlicher  does  not  belong  –  claim  that  the  country’s
problems include over-dependence on “big government” or
“Washington,” businesses hamstrung by regulations and
lawsuits, and a system that transfers too much wealth from
“makers” to “takers,” thus creating wrong incentives and
rewarding and penalizing the wrong people.  (Also,  illegal
immigrants  are  coddled  instead  of  deported,  not  enough
people are carrying guns in public places, gay people have
been granted the right to get married, and in world affairs,
America is too much the shrinking violet.) For those who
think  this  way,  Obamacare  was  enraging,  a  late-twilight
retreat toward the discredited statism that stands between
America and its former greatness. Some went so far as to
claim that harming the nation was its conscious intent.
12
Granted,  some  of  those  objections  were  not  really
serious; on many points, including the basic structure of the
ACA  itself,  Republicans  reversed  their  own  former
positions, transparently looking for any possible way first of
stopping  the  legislation  and  then  of  damaging  Obama.
Exactly  this  sort  of  demagoguery,  Orentlicher  thinks,  is
what  a  single  presidency  invites  but  a  dual  presidency
would render pointless. But even cynical arguments work
by  appealing  to  genuine  beliefs.  An  Obama  -  McCain
administration would not have abolished Americans’ great
disagreements  over  the  purpose  of  government.  It  might
have agreed on a package of minor “tweaks,” but the notion
that it would have produced substantial health reform, let
alone improved on Obamacare, just seems fanciful.
13
In fairness, another example from recent history gives
Orentlicher’s point much better support. As he says, a joint
George W. Bush - Al Gore presidency would not have made
the  appalling  error  of  invading  Iraq;  co-President  Gore
would not have agreed to it. What this suggests is that even
a very flawed constitutional design will probably work well
in  at  least  some situations.  In  the  case  of  Iraq,  it  so
happened, a status-quo bias would have been a good thing.
14
Then  again,  the  status  quo  of  March  2003  was
acceptable.  What  about  the  status  quo  of  March  1933?
Would  a  joint  Franklin  Roosevelt  -  Herbert Hoover  co-
presidency  have  launched  the  New Deal?  Would  it  have
come  to  agreement  on  massive  jobs  programs,  which
Hoover called “demoralizing”? On labor and stock-market
reforms? On federal home loans and deposit insurance? On
abandoning  the  gold  standard,  an  essential  step  that
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Hoover  had  actively  resisted?  No,  Orentlicher  concedes,
probably  not.  Offsetting  this,  he  suggests,  the  preceding
Hoover  -  Al  Smith  administration  would  have  avoided
Hoover’s mistake of raising tariffs. Overall, though, a dual
executive would most likely have locked in Hooverism – and
likewise, in the future, would give the upper hand on any
given issue to whichever president and party preferred not
to act.
15
Orentlicher’s  proposal  hearkens  back  to  the
Progressive Era at the turn of the twentieth century, when
partisan divisions partly yielded for a time to shared reform
impulses that animated both Republicans and Democrats.
But  that  was  unusual.  Programs  like  America’s  Social
Security  and  Medicare,  or  Britain’s  National  Health
Service,  popular though they later became, were not the
products of a bipartisan consensus. Imposed over strenuous
conservative  opposition,  they  exist  thanks  to  periods  of
creative policy-making made possible by large, if temporary,
one-party majorities. Orentlicher wants to ensure that such
periods  never  happen  again.  In  his  view,  this  is  a
worthwhile trade: “Reducing the risk of a very damaging
policy more than compensates for the possibility of missing
an exceptionally good policy” (157).
16
Behind  this  premise  –  and,  as  he  acknowledges,
contrary  to  the  views  of  many  contemporary  political
scientists – is a mistaken distaste for political parties that
Orentlicher shares not only with the Progressive reformers,
but  with  the  Constitution’s  framers  and,  for  that  matter,
with  most  Americans.  Underrating  the  role  of  parties  in
presidential decision-making  leads  him  to  make  two
especially  dubious  assumptions.  The  first  is  that  co-
presidents’ main points of reference would be each other,
and the joint legacy they would build by cooperating, not
the demands of their respective party “bases.” In theory, it
is  true,  neither party would have an interest  in seeing a
joint  presidency  “fail.”  But  the  parties  would  still  differ
profoundly in how they defined success and failure – and
this would be most true of each party’s activists, who would
fiercely  resist  their  co-president’s  efforts  to  cooperate  in
search of a legacy. In recent years, Republican leaders in
particular have been under huge continuing pressure from
their party’s base, which – as polls have repeatedly shown –
insists  they  “stick  to  principle”  rather  than  compromise
with  Democrats,  even  on  such  must-pass  measures  as
funding the government or honoring its bonds so as not to
destroy America’s credit. Similar if lesser pressures afflict
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Democrats: What lost Hillary Clinton the 2008 Democratic
nomination,  almost  certainly,  was  the  fact  that  she  had
angered her party’s base by voting with President Bush on
Iraq.
17
Orentlicher suggests that his proposal could change
these incentives, and he also believes it might expand the
bases, reducing  polarization,  as  more  citizens  involved
themselves  in  the  party  primary  contests  that  in  effect
would choose the co-presidents. Perhaps, but these again
seem like best-case scenarios. Activists in both parties look
at the other party and see not merely fellow citizens with
whom they disagree, but an irrational, alien presence intent
on destroying a great nation. This may be a larger problem
in America than elsewhere,  given its  millenarian political
culture and historical intermingling of very diverse groups.
Regardless,  it’s  not  a  problem that  a  dual  executive  will
erase. Whatever his personal hopes for a shared legacy, a
Republican  co-president  in  particular,  would  almost
certainly  come  under  intense  pressure  to  withhold
cooperation from the forces of darkness.
18
The  second  questionable  assumption  involves  what
withholding cooperation would mean. Orentlicher writes as
if  presidential  “decisions”  are  discrete,  occasional,  and
easily  identified events  like  the  calendared  votes  in  a
legislature. Should we leave or stay on the gold standard?
Establish Medicare, or something else? Invade Iraq, or sit
tight?  Even  if  they  disagreed  on  such  big-ticket  items,
Orentlicher supposes, the two chiefs would generally keep
the government humming along. 
19
In fact, though, the problems confronting executives
are fluid, dense and dynamic, sometimes cropping up with
no  advance  warning  and  no  time  to  spare.  This  is  most
obvious  in  military  affairs.  Combat  situations  might  not
even offer the option of doing nothing: to move troops or
hold position, to press an attack or negotiate for peace, are
all equally “actions” no matter which course is chosen. To
which would the system default if co-presidents disagreed,
especially  if  decisions  were  needed within  minutes  or  in
quick succession? Who, finally, sits at the head of the table?
Orentlicher’s vision of joint commanders in chief seems not
just impractical, but oxymoronic: if both, supposedly, are in
command, then neither is really “in chief.”
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20
Combat, however, is just an especially dramatic case.
Even the everyday work of the Executive Branch involves a
constant  flow  of  decisions.  Every  line  of  every  public
statement that comes out of the White House, every memo
and  micro-directive  to  every  federal  department,  every
posting on every federal web site is a decision, often one
that  already  requires  input  from  a  daunting  number  of
different  officials.  The  huge  federal  bureaucracy’s  many
agencies rely on signals from the White House, and from
their  politically  appointed heads,  in setting priorities and
interpreting  the  laws  they’re  given  to  implement.  What
happens  if  two  presidents  are  sending  different  signals?
Orentlicher  imagines  co-presidents  working  out  a  modus
vivendi,  parceling  out  responsibilities  in  different  policy
areas, which could usefully ease some of the presidency’s
current  burdens  and  perhaps  take  advantage  of  co-
presidents’  different  talents.  In  theory,  one  co-president
could then make decisions in his or her designated areas
without continually needing the other’s approval. 
21
But  this  too  seems  very  unlikely.  Dividing
responsibilities would be difficult enough even on paper –
and in practice, the Executive Branch is a dizzying array of
intertwined  and  overlapping  activities,  less  a  neat
organizational chart than an Escher drawing. Almost every
government  function  involves  many  agencies,  with
decisions flowing from one through another to another on
an  endless  twisting  path.  More  than  twenty  different
agencies, for instance, are members of the interagency task
force on adapting to climate change, an Obama creation.
The  task  force  attempts  to  coordinate  their  efforts  and
proposes  measures  affecting  still  more  agencies.  Now
suppose,  as  is  entirely  possible  given  current  U.S.  party
divisions, that one co-president saw climate change as an
urgent problem  while  the  other  doubted  it  was  even
happening. With what would the task force be tasked? Or
suppose the Democratic  president  took overall  charge of
the  Labor  Department,  and  the  Republican  of  the
Department of Homeland Security. A question then comes
up  concerning  immigration,  which  involves  both.  Which
president finds it in his in-box?
22
The problem is not just that policy coherence is hard
to come by even under a single president. It is also this:
Outside of the agencies themselves, the people most likely
to care about these innumerable decisions, to understand
David Orentlicher, Two Presidents Are Better Than One: The Case for a Biparti...
European journal of American studies , Reviews 2015-4 | 2015
9
and closely follow what the federal government does day to
day, are leaders and members of interest groups that are
often party-aligned, providing the party with activists and
lobbying its elected officials. These highly engaged
partisans  also  have  outsized  influence  in  choosing  the
party’s candidates. Far from honoring a scheme of divided
responsibilities,  they  would  pressure  their  respective  co-
presidents  on literally  every question that  came up.  This
would  make  agreement  very  difficult,  even  for  two
presidents  who,  left  to  themselves,  might  happily  settle
most questions over a spirited round of golf.
23
Ultimately,  what  makes  American  politics  almost
uniquely dysfunctional is not a shortage of presidents, but
an outmoded, eighteenth-century constitutional design that
tried to ignore political parties instead of putting them to
good use. A good party-based system mediates between the
people  and  the  government,  fostering  inclusion  and
accountability.  Most  modern  nations  elect  one  partisan
“government of  the day” at a given time, albeit  one that
may  be  constructed  from  a  coalition  of  multiple  but
(usually) not ideologically hostile parties. The executive in
such systems is an extension of the legislature and depends
on a legislative majority in order to function. Governments
that lose their majorities are typically dissolved, with party
leaders  “going  to  the  country”  for  new  mandates.  The
United States, however, with its “separation of powers” – a
system  based  on  an  antique  theory  of  government  from
Queen  Anne’s  England  –  has  national  elections  on  fixed
dates every two years,  choosing its  executive in partially
staggered alternation with its legislature. This means that
the two elective branches, which must cooperate for most
things to happen, will often be under the control of opposed
parties.  And since there  are  only  two significant  parties,
thanks to the overhang of other eighteenth-century forms,
that opposition will be diametrical. In effect, America often
has not one but two governments of the day, and its system
is all but intended to set them working at cross-purposes. 
24
Moreover,  since  it  turns  out  that  modern  citizens
make  somewhat  indifferent  voters, those  who  favor  the
policies  of  the  current  president  tend  to  stop  paying
attention, which means that midterm or “off-year” elections
disproportionately  draw  the  presidents’  most  determined
critics.  It  is more likely than not,  therefore,  that modern
presidents will face a hostile Congress for much, most, or
sometimes all of their terms in office. That, in fact, is the
situation  as  I  write  this.  It  involves  each  party  correctly
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noting that it won the most recent election (for its branch),
and therefore claiming that it represents the current wishes
of the American people. With both parties simultaneously
holding the people’s mandate, neither party actually does.
And this problem compounds itself:  Since each party can
block  the  other  or  force  it  to  retreat,  the  policies  that
actually emerge are neither party’s real choice. This makes
government  untransparent,  denying  voters  a  chance  to
respond  to  an  incumbent  party’s  policy  direction  with  a
clear yes or no – because there is no one incumbent party.
It’s a situation of astonishing danger, an open opportunity
for sabotage of a kind that Republicans in the Obama years
have all but bragged of seizing. Voters are invited, in the
fine old tradition, to cast angry votes against the do-nothing
bum  –  thus  perversely  empowering  the  saboteurs,  and
ensuring that the bum can do even less.
25
Orentlicher is aware of all this. He explains why he
thinks a dual presidency would solve it, not simply write the
current  gridlock  into  the  Constitution.  His  is  a
comparatively simple change, he argues, since the rest of
the constitutional design would be left undisturbed. But if
that’s  the  criterion,  the  real  problem  would  be  better
addressed through an even simpler change: increase House
members’ terms to four years – a good reform in itself, in
this age of endless campaign fundraising – and eliminate
midterm elections. This would tie the choice of executive
more  closely  to  the  choice  of  a  legislative  majority,
producing  a  more  or  less  cohesive  government  whose
unsabotaged achievements, then, voters could review and
either approve or reject. It would preserve the separation of
powers, in case that’s thought to be important, but without
the current separation of electorates and mandates.
26
When they’re involved in setting up governments for
other countries, American leaders themselves normally opt
for unseparated parliamentary systems of  some kind,  not
variants of their own creaky, counterintuitive, and bizarrely
complex “presidential” system from the age of ruffled cuffs
and  powdered  wigs.  Yet  that  same  wisdom  deserts
Americans when they consider their own system. Precisely
because of its archaic mystique, the Constitution is treated
as holy  writ.  It  is  not  a  jumble of  political  compromises,
patched  up  through  guesswork  in a  snuff-filled  room  of
yesteryear – a system with a mixed record of partial success
and occasional huge failure, long overdue for rethinking in
light  of  the  actual  needs  of  modern  nations  and  the
historical  experiences  of  Western  governments  over  the
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past  two  and  a  quarter  centuries.  No,  say  some,  it  is
literally divinely inspired, God’s own blessing on his chosen
nation.
27
Despite this, reforms based on parliamentary models
have  occasionally  been  proposed.  Orentlicher  surveys  a
number of these but rejects them, embracing instead the
framers’  basic  logic:  the  best  way  to  keep  government
focused on the public good is not to set parties against each
other,  inviting  the  people  to  choose  between  them  at
regular intervals, but to set the government against itself.
“Unified  executive  and  legislative  branches  that  promote
one political  party’s  agenda may not  serve  the  country’s
interests  well,”  he  writes.  “Efficient  lawmaking  does  not
guarantee  good  lawmaking”  (135).  No,  but  it  could  help
guarantee some lawmaking. “To be sure,” says Orentlicher,
“dividing  power  makes  it  more  difficult  to  implement
change, but that was an important part of the constitutional
plan.  The  framers  understood  that they  were  creating  a
government prone to inertia” (135). By following “the kind
of structural approach that typifies the U.S. constitutional
system,”  his  proposal  would  complete  that  original  plan:
“Just as the framers protected against the accumulation of
power  and  factional  conflict  by  dividing  power  and
requiring it to be shared, so would a coalition presidency
work by dividing the executive power and requiring it to be
shared” (17).
28
It  is  not  clear  that  the  framers  actively  hoped  for
inertia;  opinions  were  at  least  divided,  with  Alexander
Hamilton  famously  preferring  “energy,”  and  the  framing
project itself an effort to give the disjointed new nation a
centralized  means  for  getting  things  done.  It  was  the
Constitution’s opponents who demanded checks and limits;
highlighting  these  was  partly  salesmanship,  the  framers’
artful appeal to an ambivalent public. At any rate, the bias
toward inertia is  a weakness.  Yet this is  the feature that
Orentlicher seeks not just to preserve but to intensify, even
while  transforming  the  system  more  drastically  than
Americans have contemplated since the 1780s. The single
head of government is one of the world’s best-established
political  conventions.  Orentlicher  would  have  America
break  from  it  permanently,  something  no  other  modern
Western nation has done, while nonetheless clinging to a
political  theory  from  the  eighteenth  century.  He  is
proposing radical change while also arbitrarily limiting it –
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“thinking  outside  the  box”  while  confining  himself  to  a
different box.
29
In the end, Orentlicher seems to admit that the book
has been largely an intellectual exercise. He expresses hope
that his proposal, even if not enacted, can help Americans
identify  solutions  by  clarifying  their  problems’  causes.  It
does,  although  not  in  the  way  he  intends.  The  U.S.
government  needs  fewer  veto  points,  not  more,  and  the
implausibly harmonious politics imagined in Two Presidents
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